By Charles Y. Glock, Robert N. Bellah
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It is trivially true, on the physicalist assumption I am making, that all property instantiations are realized by a single state of affairs, namely the state of affairs that consists in the existence of all of the micro-entities there are (and their being all the micro-entities there are, which is a negative existential state of affairs), and these micro-entities having all of the properties they do and standing to one another in all of the relations they stand in. But it seems a reasonable assumption that every property instantiation is realized in microphysical states of affairs less global than this, and that, indeed, each is realized in a microphysical state of affairs that does not contain as a proper part any state of affairs that realizes it.
G1 . . ∀Gn (if ( . . G27 . . ] This says, in effect, that P is the unique property that (a) plays the relevant functional role and (b) is implied by every other property that plays it. It is still true, on this version of the account, that each of the realizers of P plays the relevant functional role. Each of them does this by playing a richer role that embeds that of P. As before, if we think of the instance of the realizer as containing the instance of the realized property as a part, this will not amount to overdetermination.
This property confers whatever conditional powers are conferred by the property of being a braking system, but confers a number of others that are not conferred by other realizers of that functional property—for example, those that give us hydraulic braking systems, or electronic ones. So consider the set of conditional powers it confers that are not conferred by the functional property. This set will not be closed under nomic and metaphysical entailment, since anything having all of these will have the conditional powers conferred by the functional property.