Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives by Quentin Smith, Aleksandar Jokic

By Quentin Smith, Aleksandar Jokic

Realization is likely to be the main difficult challenge we people face in attempting to comprehend ourselves. right here, eighteen essays provide new angles at the topic. The participants, who comprise a number of the best figures in philosophy of brain, talk about such relevant themes as intentionality, extraordinary content material, and the relevance of quantum mechanics to the research of consciousness.

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Even when I am interested in my past, I’m not interested in it specifically insofar as it is mine. I’m perfectly well aware that it is mine, insofar as I am a human being considered as a whole, but I do not really think of it as mine at all, insofar as ‘mine’ picks out me as I am now. e. 22 They’re certainly distinctive in their ‘from-the-inside’ character, but this in itself doesn’t mark them as mine in any emotionally significant sense. The one striking exception to this, in my case, used to be—but no longer is—memory of recent embarrassment.

What about the other way round? Here I think there is a fundamental dependence: metaphysical investigation of the nature of the self is subordinate to phenomenological investigation of the sense of the self. ’6 This equivalence claim can be split in two: (E1) If there is such a thing as the self, then some sense of the mental self is an accurate representation of something that exists (E2) If some sense of the mental self is an accurate representation of something that exists, then there is such a thing as the self.

E2), by contrast, rules that nothing can fail to count as a mental self if it possesses all the properties that feature in some sense of the mental self, whatever other properties it may possess or lack. It states a sufficient condition on qualifying for the title of self—it lays it down that there is no further test to pass. 6 I take it that a representation R of a thing X is accurate if (and only if ) X really has the properties R represents it as having. R need not be complete to be accurate.

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